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Abstract 
This paper examines Chinese students’ risk attitude using buying and selling 
experiments with lotteries. We found that subjects were more risk averse in the buying 
experiment than in the selling experiment, suggesting the endowment effect. In the 
selling experiment, subjects were risk loving when there was a low win probability and 
risk averse with a high win probability, whereas they were risk averse in the buying 
experiment. Using the prize money won during the experiment as a measure of wealth, 
we found decreasing absolute risk aversion. Subjects’ risk attitude as revealed in the 
experiments explains their risky asset holding behavior. 
JEL classification: C91, D81 
Keywords: risk aversion, economic experiment, China 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines Chinese students’ risk attitude by using buying and selling 
experiments with lotteries, based on the BDM method (Becker et al., 1964). 
Experiments in China are especially interesting in that prizes won by subjects are 
relatively large compared to those in developed countries because of the high 
purchasing power of the Chinese yuan. It is often argued that economic experiments are 
not reliable because prizes are too small to give subjects an adequate incentive. 
Experiments in China might be immune to such a criticism.1 Indeed, the cost of living 
in 2005 was 6.5 times lower for our Chinese subjects than for Japanese subjects after an 
exchange rate conversion.2 Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there have been few such 
experiments in China.3  
Our experiment is unique in that we conducted both a buying and a selling 
experiment with the same subjects. Previous studies conducted selling experiments 
(Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992, Eichberger et al., 2003) and buying experiments 
(Cramer et al., 2002, Shavit et al., 2001, Hartog et al., 2002) separately. However, to our 
knowledge, no studies have examined both selling and buying experiments 
                                                 
1 Another response to this criticism is to use the results of TV shows that pay huge prizes. Fullenkamp et 
al. (2003) and Beetsma and Schotman (2001) reported that people are risk averse, while Metrick (1995) 
does not reject the proposition that they are risk neutral. 
2 This figure is based on responses to our questionnaire from subjects of the experiment done in Shanghai 
and Tokyo. We asked the cost of living per month. 
3 Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) were a notable exception. They conducted an experiment to measure 
risk attitude and found that the risk attitude of Chinese subjects did not differ from that of subjects in the 
US and Canada. They are risk loving for lotteries with a small win probability and risk neutral otherwise. 
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comprehensively. 4  Comparing the results of previous studies based on selling and 
buying experiments, one could argue that subjects participating in buying experiments 
were more risk averse than those in selling experiments. However, it is not convincing 
to draw the conclusion that people are more risk averse when they sell lottery tickets 
than when they buy them, as the difference may be due to a difference in subject 
characteristics. Thus, it is important to conduct an experiment where the same subjects 
participate in both buying and selling experiments. 
Our study was also unique in that we asked the subjects to answer a detailed 
questionnaire that included scenario questions on risk attitude. We analyzed how risk 
attitude related to their demographic and economic attributes such as knowledge of 
financial economics and  wealth. Although Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers et al. (2001), 
and Hartog et al. (2002) examined these relationships using questionnaire surveys, our 
method has merit in that we measured risk attitude in a controlled experiment where 
subjects had monetary incentives. We examined whether subjects’ risk attitudes can 
explain their risky asset holdings. We also investigated whether subjects’ risk attitudes 
as revealed in the experiments were consistent with those in the questionnaire. Finally, 
we examined how subjects’ risk aversion correlated with their time discount rates, 
which was measured in our experiment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain our 
experimental method. In Section 3, we show the risk attitude according to probability of 
                                                 
4  Knetsch and Sinden (1984) is a notable exception. Their TEST3 consists of buying and selling 
experiments which ask similar questions to ours. However, they are different from ours in that different 
subjects are used for buying and selling experiments.     
  3
winning a lottery and compare the results with those of Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992). 
In Section 4, we investigate how risk attitude relates to the attributes of the subjects. In 
Section 5, we analyze whether subjects’ risk attitudes can account for their actual 
behaviors. In Section 6, we compare the risk attitude revealed in the experiment and in 
the questionnaire. In Section 7, we examine the relationship between time discount rate 
and risk aversion. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Experimental method 
The experiment was conducted on March 11, 2005, at Fudan University in 
Shanghai. Subjects were 30 undergraduate students of the Department of World 
Economics at Fudan University.5 Their attributes are summarized in Table 1. Out of 30 
subjects, 26 (86%) were female. The subjects were 20 or 21 years old. Their income and 
wealth was widely dispersed; household income ranged from less than 20,000 yuan 
(US$2,400) to over 220,000 yuan (US$26,400) and the mode was 20,000 (US$2,400) to 
40,000 yuan (US$4,800). 
[Table 1 about here] 
The experiment on risk attitude started at 6 pm and ended around 8 pm. An 
experiment on time discounting was then conducted until 9 pm. The subjects were then 
requested to complete a test on financial economics and fill in a questionnaire. As for  
the test, refer to Appendix A. The session finished around 10 pm.6 
                                                 
5 One subject felt unwell and left after the selling experiment was completed, so that the number of the 
subjects for the buying experiment was 29. 
6 According to teachers and students at Fudan University, the students there study until around 10 pm 
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The experiment was based on the BDM method as follows. 
Selling experiment: Subjects were given a lottery ticket by which they receive 
1000 points if they win and nothing otherwise. The win probability was set 
randomly by the computer in each round. After subjects put their selling price 
into the computer, the computer showed its buying price, which was 
determined randomly. If the buying price exceeded the selling price, the lottery 
ticket was traded at the buying price. Otherwise, subjects retained their tickets 
and the computer determined the win or lose randomly following the win 
probability. Subjects who won got 1000 points. Subjects who lost received 
nothing. The subjects recorded their results in each round in order to check the 
results and to have time to consider their strategies. This procedure was 
repeated for five rounds as practice and for 20 rounds as real sessions. At the 
end, the points obtained in the real sessions were summed and converted to 
yuan with 1000 points equal to 20 yuan (US$2.4); that amount was paid at the 
end of all the experiments on that day. 
Buying experiment: The buying experiment was the same as the selling 
experiment with the following exception. Subjects were given 10,000 points at 
the outset.7 They input their buying price (the highest value that they could 
offer) for a lottery ticket for which the win probability was shown on their own 
                                                                                                                                               
every day, so the evening experiment was not a burden to them. We conducted the experiment in the 
evening because it was difficult to recruit students during for daytime experiments as they were expected 
to attend classes.  
7 This is necessary because in selling experiment subjects were given 20 lottery tickets with the expected 
payoff of 10,000 points. Furthermore, subjects would have been too embarrassed to buy a lottery ticket if 
they had no points at the outset. 
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display. If this buying price exceeded the selling price offered by the computer, 
the ticket was traded to the subject at the selling price. In this case, if they won, 
the payoff was the 1000 points minus the selling price; if they lost, they 
suffered a loss equal to the selling price.  
Points won by subjects and their converted payoffs in yuan are presented in Table 2. 
The average payoff was 261 yuan (US$31, 13,033points) for the selling experiment and 
260 yuan (US$31, 12,977 points) for the buying experiment.8  
[Table 2 about here] 
3. Risk attitudes in the selling and buying experiment 
We adopted the following measure of absolute risk aversion (ARA) developed in 
Cramer et al. (2002): 
)2(2/1 22 papZaZ
paZARA +−×
−= ,                                                          
where Z is the lottery prize, p is the price evaluated by a subject, and a is the win 
probability. We also present the result of the “transformed risk averse price (TP)” 
defined as:  
aZ
pTP −= 1 .                                                                       
To compare our results with those in Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), we 
calculated the average ARA and TP for each category of win probability, 0–10%, 10–
20%, and so on. The results are presented in Figures 1–4, where the horizontal axis 
                                                 
8 In addition to payoffs, subjects received a 120 yuan (US$14) participation fee. 
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represents the win probability and the vertical axis represents ARA or TP. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows  TP for the selling experiment, which corresponds to Figures 1 and 
2 in Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992).9 These figures appear superficially similar. The 
subjects were risk loving in lotteries with win probabilities of less than 20% and almost 
risk neutral in the others. Close examination, however, reveals a difference. As Figure 1 
in our paper shows, subjects were risk averse in the lotteries with win probabilities of 
over 30%, at the 5% significance level, whereas Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) 
reported that the subjects were at most risk neutral.10 Kachelmeier and Shehata’s result 
was important because subjects facing very high rewards in the experiment were risk 
loving or neutral, implying that these characteristics did not appear just because they 
were gambling for smaller amounts of money. Indeed, they show that the subjects were 
risk loving in lotteries with small prizes, but risk neutral in lotteries with large prizes, 
implying that the subjects became more risk averse as prizes became larger. If subjects’ 
risk attitudes vary depending on the amount of prizes as they observed, it would be 
possible to interpret our results as meaning that our subjects show a risk-averse attitude 
because the prize was very large. The average prize won by the subjects was 632 yuan 
(US$76) while they reported that their average monthly living expenses were 2048 yuan 
(US$246); subjects therefore earned on average one third of their monthly living 
                                                 
9 Note that Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) show the certainty-equivalent ratio, which is equivalent to 1-
TP.  
10 They do not show the confidence interval, so that we cannot evaluate the significance of their results. 
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expenses in two hours.11 Our results cast a doubt on Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992)’s 
finding: people may be risk averse in lotteries with a win probability greater than 30%. 
If we adopt the other risk measure, ARA, the risk-averse attitudes become more 
evident. In Figure 2, the subjects were risk loving only in lotteries with win probabilities 
of less than 10%. They were risk neutral in lotteries with win probabilities of 10–50%, 
and risk averse in those of over 60%.12 Specifically, it seems that they became more risk 
averse with higher win probabilities. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figures 3 and 4 show the results of the buying experiments.13 These results are 
quite different from those in Figures 1 and 2. Specifically, the subjects showed risk-
averse attitudes in lotteries with any win probability, which is consistent with the usual 
assumptions of economic theory. 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
To check whether the difference between risk attitudes in selling and buying 
experiments is significant, we regressed the risk attitude variables (ARA and TP) over 
the win probability (PROB) and the buying dummy variable (BUY), which is set at unity 
for buying experiments and zero for selling experiments. We pooled all the data, 20 
rounds for each of the selling and buying experiments multiplied by the number of 
                                                 
11 According to a teacher at Fudan University, most Chinese students’ living expenses per month should 
be under or around 1000 yuan (US$120). If this is true, our prize is tantamount to more than half their 
monthly living expenses.  
12 These results are the same as those from Japanese experiments. See Tsutsui et al. (2005).  
13 In the calculation of ARA data, we excluded one sample because the subject assigned 999 points to a 
lottery with a win probability of 100%, leading to an extreme value of 2. 
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subjects, and estimated fixed effects and random effects models.  
The estimation results are presented in the first and second columns of Table 3. 
Here, we show the results of a random effects model for the case of ARA; the random 
effects model was not rejected against the fixed effects model on the basis of the 
Hausman specification test. However, for the case of TP, the results of the fixed effects 
model are shown because the random effects model was rejected at the 1% significance 
level. The estimated coefficients of PROB are always positive and significant, implying 
that the subjects show more risk-averse attitudes to lotteries with higher win 
probabilities. This can be seen in Figure 2 (ARA; selling experiment), whereas Figure 4 
(ARA; buying experiment) does not show this tendency. Regression analysis of 
combined data from both experiments confirms the tendency. The coefficients of BUY 
are significantly positive for both cases, indicating that the subjects are significantly 
more risk averse in buying experiments than in selling. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Figures 1–4 reveal differently shaped graphs in many aspects between selling and 
buying experiments; e.g.,  ARA and TP are decreasing in win probability in buying 
experiments, while they are increasing in the selling experiments. To confirm the 
differences, we added PROB2, BUY*PROB, PROB2, and BUY*PROB2 into the 
regression equation. The estimation results are shown in the third and fourth columns of 
Table 3. ARA and TP are increasing in PROB in the selling experiments, while ARA is 
decreasing in the buying experiments. The tendency is not clear in the case of TP in the 
buying experiments. ARA and TP are concave in the selling experiments, while ARA is 
convex and TP is concave in the buying experiments. These results are also confirmed 
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by the estimation splitting the samples between the selling and buying experiments (see 
columns 5–8 in Table 3). 
The finding that subjects are risk averse in buying experiments has been reported 
in Shavit et al. (2001), Hartog et al. (2002), and Cramer et al. (2002). In addition, the 
finding that subjects are risk loving or risk neutral in selling experiments has been 
reported in Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) and Eichberger et al. (2003). Our 
experimental results confirm that subjects exhibit different risk attitudes in selling and 
buying lotteries even when the same subjects participated in both experiments. 
Why does risk attitude differ between selling and buying experiments? One 
argument is that the subjects learned the structure of the experiments and the optimal 
strategy during the selling experiment that was conducted before the buying experiment, 
so that they revealed their true attitude in the buying experiments. However, this 
interpretation is not very convincing because the amount of money won by the subjects 
did not differ between experiments, leading us to reject the notion of a learning effect. 
Another possible interpretation for higher risk aversion in the buying experiment is the 
endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990). Among other studies, Knetsch and Sinden 
(1984) observed that subjects’ willingness to accept (WTA) in a lottery was higher than 
their willingness to pay (WTP), which implies that they were more risk averse when 
they bought a lottery ticket than when they sold one. Our finding is consistent with this 
endowment effect.   
4. How does the risk attitude relate to attributes of the subjects? 
In this section, we examine how the risk attitude revealed in the experiments 
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relates to the socioeconomic attributes of the subjects. Specifically, we focus on wealth, 
knowledge of financial economics, and gender. 
How risk attitude depends on wealth has been an important topic. Arrow (1970) 
argues decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion with 
respect to wealth. As for absolute risk aversion, using the results of a questionnaire 
survey, Hartog et al. (2002) find decreasing absolute risk aversion with respect to 
respondents’ annual income. Based on survey results, Donkers et al. (2001) also report 
that risk aversion decreases as income increases, although they do not use absolute risk 
aversion as the risk measure. In an experiment in which subjects invest money into risky 
projects, Levy (1994) found decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing (or 
constant, at most) relative risk aversion with respect to wealth varying during the 
experiment. As for relative risk aversion, most studies measure relative risk aversion 
using the risky asset holding ratio, and decreasing relative risk aversion has been 
reported instead (Cohn et al., 1975, Guiso et al., 1996, and Kessler and Wolf, 1991). 
The effect of education on risk attitude has been also studied. Donkers et al. (2001) 
and Hartog et al. (2002) report that subjects with higher education levels tend to be 
more risk loving. In this paper, the subjects are all university students, and our aim was 
to investigate the effect of knowledge of financial economics on their risk attitude. As 
standard finance theory is based on the assumption that economic agents are risk averse, 
students who study finance theory may believe that they must behave as if they are risk 
averse. To test this hypothesis, after the experiments we requested the subjects to 
complete a test that consisted of seven economics problems including three on risk 
aversion. We analyzed the relationship between the test score and risk attitude. 
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As in the previous section, we pooled all the data, 40 rounds multiplied by the 
number of subjects, and estimated fixed and random effects models with them. Because 
some of the subjects did not answer questions about their income and assets, their 
observations were dropped from the estimation. Win probability (PROB) and the 
dummy variable representing the buying experiment (BUY) are considered in the 
regression analysis, as risk attitude is systematically influenced by these, as shown in 
the previous section. 
For the gender variable, we adopted a dummy variable MALE, which takes the 
value of unity if the subject is a male, and zero otherwise. For the variable representing 
knowledge on financial economics, we adopted TEST, which is the score of the subjects 
on the test conducted immediately after the experiment. For the wealth data, we 
considered three different variables, INCOME, ASSETS, and POINTS, whose definitions 
will be explained below.  
The results of the random effects model are shown in Table 4 for the cases of ARA 
and TP because the Hausman specification test does not reject random effects models 
against fixed effects models. In the first and second columns, the results when ASSETS 
is adopted as the wealth variable are shown, where ASSETS is the logarithm of the 
amount of financial and real assets owned by a subject’s household. PROB and BUY are 
significantly positive, confirming the results in Table 3. TEST is positive, but 
insignificant. MALE is negative, but only significant in the TP case. ASSETS is positive, 
but insignificant. This unexpected result might be because ASSETS includes assets 
owned by the subjects’ parents. ASSETS probably does not represent most subjects’ 
personal wealth. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
Considering the above problem, we adopted INCOME, which is defined as the 
logarithm of subjects’ annual income including support from their parents. The results 
are presented in the third and fourth columns. PROB, BUY, and MALE produce similar 
results to the case of ASSETS. TEST is positive and significant at around the 10% level 
here. INCOME is negative as expected, but insignificant. 
A problem with INCOME may be that it is constant for all the rounds of the 
experiments, whereas risk attitude measured as ARA or TP differed between rounds. 
Meanwhile, actual wealth of the subjects was also changed by the prizes they won in 
each round. We should not neglect this change in wealth during the experiment, which 
the subjects confirmed on their PC monitors in each round; they also wrote the value on 
their record sheets. According to the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
subjects may recognize the outset of the experiment as the “reference point” and focus 
on the change in wealth resulting from wins and losses in each lottery.  
In the fifth and sixth columns, we present the results with POINTS adopted as the 
wealth variable, where POINTS is the cumulative total of points that subjects had won 
before each round of the experiment. The effect of INCOME, which varies only among 
subjects, if at all, may be captured in individual constant terms. POINTS is significantly 
negative as expected, implying decreasing absolute risk aversion. The coefficients of the 
other variables are similar to the results obtained when INCOME or ASSETS are used. 
INCOME, which represents the level of wealth before the experiment, may have an 
additional effect to POINTS on risk attitude. To examine this possibility, we included 
both POINTS and INCOME as the wealth variables. The results, which also include 
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ASSETS, are shown in the seventh and eighth columns of Table 4. POINTS is again 
negative and significant. INCOME is still insignificant, but its P-value increases to 15% 
for the ARA case. ASSETS is again positive but not significant. These results confirm the 
conclusion that absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth.  
Arrow (1970) argued that relative risk aversion (RRA) may be increasing with 
wealth. However, the empirical evidence is not decisive. Although most of the studies 
on relative risk aversion adopted the risky asset holding ratio as the measure of relative 
risk aversion, our study is unique in that we used the more direct measure of relative 
risk aversion derived from the pricing of lotteries. We constructed RRA by multiplying 
ARA by POINTS, and regressed it against POINTS (representing wealth), PROB, and 
BUY. 14  The results are presented in the ninth column of Table 4. POINTS is not 
significant, implying constant relative risk aversion. We repeated the analysis using 
RRA defined as ARA×exp(ASSETS) and ARA×exp(INCOME) to obtain similar results. 
These results suggest that relative risk aversion is constant with respect to wealth, 
supporting the conventional use of the constant relative risk averse (CRRA) utility 
function in macrofinance. 
Let us summarize the results of the other variables. The coefficient of PROB is 
always significantly positive, implying that the subjects are more risk averse in lotteries 
with higher win probabilities. The coefficient of BUY is always significantly positive, 
confirming the estimation results in the preceding section. The coefficient of MALE is 
always negative but significant at the 5% level only when the dependent variable is TP. 
                                                 
14 As the fixed effects model is chosen by the Hausman specification test, MALE and TEST are dropped in 
the estimation. 
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The observation that males are more risk loving than females is consistent with the 
findings of Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers et al. (2001), and Hartog et al. (2002), all of 
which were based on questionnaire surveys. 
The coefficient of TEST is always positive but significant at the 10% level only 
when the dependent variable is ARA and when INCOME was utilized as the wealth 
variable. Although this result is not strong, it suggests that students who have more 
knowledge of financial economics are likely to be more risk averse. Levy and Levy 
(2001, 2002) measured risk attitudes of business school students and practitioners (fund 
managers and financial analysts) to find that practitioners were more risk averse than 
students. As practitioners would have more knowledge about financial economics than 
students, these results are consistent with ours. Meanwhile, Donkers et al. (2001) and 
Hartog et al. (2002) reported that subjects with higher education levels tend to be more 
risk loving. Thus, a consistent interpretation is that higher general education levels 
make people more risk loving, but specific knowledge of financial economics makes 
people more risk averse. 
5. Subjects’ risky asset holdings and their risk attitudes 
Can risk attitude revealed in the experiment explain subjects’ actual behavior? In 
this section, we investigate the relationship between subjects’ risk attitudes and their 
risky asset holdings. We postulate that more risk-averse subjects have smaller 
proportions of risky assets, and we test this hypothesis with our data. 
As for the risky asset holdings, we asked the following question in the 
questionnaire completed at the end of the experiment. 
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What percentage of the financial assets of your entire household are in 
Investment Trusts, Stocks, Futures/Options, Corporate Bonds, Foreign 
Currency Deposits, Government Bonds of Foreign Countries? 
Let us define the variable RISK as the percentage that subjects reported in response 
to this question. As the variable for risk attitude for each subject, we define AVARA and 
AVTP as the average ARA and average TP over the 40 rounds in the selling and buying 
experiments.  
We regressed RISK against AVARA (or AVTP), ASSETS (or INCOME), and 
MALE.15 The estimation results are shown in Table 5. Tobit was used for the estimation 
because one subject answered that she had no risky assets.16 The estimated coefficients 
of AVARA were significantly negative, supporting our hypothesis, while those of AVTP 
were negative but insignificant.  
[Table 5 about here] 
This is somewhat surprising, considering that AVARA represents the subjects’ risk 
attitude, while the risky asset holding ratio is usually determined by their parents. Thus, 
to understand this result, we need to assume that risk attitudes of parents and children 
correlate. Is this assumption reasonable? The answer is “yes.” Indeed, Hirata et al. 
(2006) conducted a questionnaire survey of parents and their children and found that the 
correlation coefficient between the risk aversion of parents and their children was 0.18 
                                                 
15 We do not use POINTS as the wealth variable here because risky asset holding has nothing to do with 
the change in wealth during the experiments.  
16 The results by OLS are almost the same as those in Table 5. 
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when lottery questions were used.17 Thus, the finding of negative correlation between 
parents’ risky asset holding ratio and children’s absolute risk aversion may be 
reasonable. 
ASSETS is significantly positive, whereas INCOME is positive but insignificant. 
This result is reasonable because ASSETS comprises assets owned by the household, 
whereas INCOME is the income of the subjects (i.e., the children). The risky asset 
holding ratio of a household may relate more strongly to the former than to the latter. 
However, the positive correlation between RISK and ASSETS is not consistent with 
the theoretical model of Friend and Blume (1975). They developed a model based on 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in which the proportion of risky assets to total 
assets (RISK) is equal to the ratio of expected excess return )( fm rr −  and variance of 
return on the market portfolio )( 2mσ  divided by relative risk aversion (RRA). That is: 
RRA
rr
RISK
m
fm
2
)(
σ
−= .                                                                                 
Most previous researchers, including Friend and Blume (1975) themselves, relied 
on this relation to use risky asset share (RISK) as a proxy for risk tolerance (
RRA
1 ) and 
examined how RRA relates to the wealth. Thus, in their analyses, if relative risk 
aversion is increasing with respect to wealth, risky asset share should negatively relate 
                                                 
17 The sample size was 260, so the correlation coefficients were significant (5% critical value is 0.12). 
Hirata et al. (2006) report that the correlation coefficient between time discount rates of parents and their 
children is around 0.2, while the correlation coefficient between random pairs who have no relationship is 
zero. 
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to the wealth. However, in many cases, the opposite is detected, indicating that the 
relation does not describe reality (e.g. MacCarthy (2004))18   
Our paper is unique in that we can test the relation between risky asset share and 
RRA because we have data on absolute risk aversion as well as the wealth. As relative 
risk aversion is absolute risk aversion multiplied by wealth, Friend and Blume’s (1975) 
model predicts that the share of risky assets negatively correlates with ARA and ASSETS, 
when both of them are included in regression equation to explain RISK. This is indeed 
what we report in Table 5. Although our result is consistent with the model in that ARA 
negatively correlates to the share, it does not support the model because the coefficient 
of ASSETS is significantly positive. Our results suggest that use of risky asset share as a 
proxy for RRA may be problematic. Moreover, we found that RRA is constant with 
respect to the wealth in the preceding section, implying that RISK would have been 
constant with respect to the wealth, if Friend and Blume’s (1975) model is true. The fact 
that RISK positively correlates to the wealth suggests the rejection of their model.   
A problem of this estimation is that ASSETS consists of real asset and financial 
asset, while RISK is defined as the ratio to financial asset only. Thus, it may be 
appropriate to estimate the equation adopting financial asset (FINASSETS) instead of 
ASSETS. The results are shown in the far right columns of Table 5. The results generally 
confirm the above conclusion: that AVARA is significantly negative at the 10% level and 
FINASSETS is positive, even if it is not significant at the 10% level.  
                                                 
18 Friend and Blume (1975) themselves reported that risky asset share positively correlates to financial 
assets. However, when wealth is defined as the total of financial and real assets, they found the negative 
correlation. 
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The risky asset holding of male subjects is higher than that of female subjects 
(32.6% vs. 22.2%), and males are less risk-averse than females (AVARA is 0.09 vs. 0.58). 
However, MALE is positive but insignificant in Table 5, implying that the higher risky 
asset holding of males is due to their lower risk aversion and nothing else. 
6. Subjects’ risk attitude in experiments and in the questionnaire 
In the questionnaire completed at the end of the experiment, we asked several 
questions to elicit subjects’ attitudes toward various types of risk. Specifically, we 
asked: 
When you go out, how high does the probability of rain usually have to be 
before you take an umbrella? 
We define the variable RAIN as 100–x, where x(%) is the answer to this question. We 
also asked: 
One proverb, “Nothing ventured, nothing gained,” reveals a belief that it is 
necessary to take risks if you expect excellent results. On the other hand, 
another proverb, “A wise man never courts danger,” reveals a belief that you 
should avoid risks as much as possible. Which way of thinking is closest to 
yours? On a scale of 0–10 with “10” being completely in agreement with the 
former statement, and “0” being completely in agreement with the latter 
statement, please rate your behavioral pattern. 
We define VENTURE as 10–x, where x is the answer to this question. 
Another question was: 
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When you go out, are you usually careful about locking doors/windows and 
turning off appliances to prevent a fire? On a scale of 0–10 with “10” being the 
“least careful”, and “0” being the “most careful”, please rate your level of 
caution.  
We define FIRE as 10–x, where x is the answer to this question. 
Questions 13–16 asked the subjects their subjective price in various lotteries, 
which are similar to the trials in the experiment. Specifically, in Q13 subjects were 
asked what their buying price would be in a lottery with a prize of 160 yuan (US$19) 
with a win probability of 50%. Question 14 asked their buying price in a lottery with the 
prize of 8000 yuan (US$960) with a win probability of 1%. Question 15 asked the 
selling price of the lottery in Q13. Question 16 asked about insurance against losses 
instead of a lottery. Specifically, we asked: 
Assume that you know there is a 1% chance of being robbed of 8000 yuan 
(US$960). However, you can take out an insurance policy that covers losses 
from a robbery. How much would you pay for this insurance? 
For Q13–Q16, we calculated the ARA and TP for each subject. The correlation 
coefficient between AVARA in the experiment and risk attitude in the questionnaire is 
shown in the first column in the top panel of Table 6. 
[Table 6 about here] 
AVARA revealed in the experiment significantly correlated with RAIN and 
VENTURE, but it did not significantly correlate with FIRE. AVARA has a relatively high 
correlation with Q13ARA and Q15ARA, which are the most similar questions to that in 
the experiment. These results imply that the risk attitudes revealed in the experiments 
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and in the questionnaire are generally consistent.19 
At the same time, however, the results in Table 6 suggest that risk attitude varies 
substantially depending on the types of risk asked about. The correlation between 
AVARA and Q14ARA is almost zero. These two questions ask about risk attitudes in 
quite different situations: the prize in Q14ARA was very large (8000 yuan (US$960)), 
while the prize in the experiment was only 20 yuan (US$2.4). The correlation between 
Q16ARA and AVARA is also close to zero. These two questions are also quite different. 
In Q16ARA, subjects were asked their subjective price of insurance where the possible 
loss was very large (8000 yuan (US$960)), while attitude towards an uncertain small 
gain (20 yuan (US$960)) is asked in the experiment. 
In sum, although one may expect all the variables in Table 6 to be highly correlated 
because they all represent risk attitude, this is not the case at all. The risk attitude is 
quite different depending on the type of risk.  
This finding is confirmed if we look at the correlations between items in the 
questionnaire instead of looking at the correlations between those in the experiment and 
in the questionnaire. In the top panel of Table 6, a positive correlation is significant at 
the 5% level in only three cases out of 2820. This result may be due to the following 
reasons. One is that the measures based on psychological questions, RAIN, VENTURE, 
and FIRE, ask about attitudes toward different types of risks. Rain risk is a small risk, 
                                                 
19 Therefore, the low correlation mentioned below is not due to the difference in methods (experiment and 
questionnaire). 
20 Only one case is significant out of 21 cases between items in the questionnaire, which is, the correlation 
between the most similar questions (Q13 and Q15). 
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while fire risk is a large risk, and people may show different attitudes depending on the 
risk size. The second possible reason, already argued above, is that Q13 and Q14 have 
different win probabilities and different prizes, which results in the different risk 
attitudes demonstrated in Section 3. Question 16 is concerned with insurance against an 
expected loss, while Q13–Q15 are concerned with the evaluation of an expected gain. 
Thus, “loss aversion” proposed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) produces a different 
risk attitude. If the difference is not identical among the subjects, correlation will be 
weak or even negative. 
In the bottom panel of Table 6, we show the correlation between AVTP of the 
experiment and several variables from the questionnaire. Here, AVTP in the experiment 
has a positive correlation with all the measures in the questionnaire, although it is 
insignificant. Most of the correlation coefficients are positive, but they are not 
significant, confirming the results of AVARA.  
7. Risk aversion negatively correlates with time discount rate 
In this section, we examine the relationship between time discounting and risk 
aversion. The time discount rate is calculated from the results of an experiment 
conducted after the experiment on risk attitude. Let us briefly explain the experiment on 
time discount rate. 
Subjects were asked to choose whether they would prefer to (A) receive u yuan 
after x months (or x’ days) or (B) receive v yuan after y months (or y’ days). We fix u, x, 
and y, and change v from a small amount to a large amount for 32 pairs to find the point 
at which the subjects switch from A to B. Let us call the interest rate corresponding to 
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this switching R (%). Higher R indicates a higher discount rate. We conducted the 
experiments for 12 pairs of (u, x, y) including experiments with and without prizes, so 
that there are 12 items of data on R for each subject21. We take the logarithm of these Rs 
and average them (TD).  
The correlation between the time discount rate TD and AVARA is –0.274, and that 
between TD and AVTP is –0.114. They are negative, although insignificant, suggesting 
that less patient people may tend to be less risk averse. The negative correlation 
between the time discount rate and risk aversion is also reported in Hiruma and Tsutsui 
(2005) and Tsutsui et al. (2005), who based their findings on experiments with Japanese 
subjects. Thus, the observation may be a robust fact, even if the correlation is not strong. 
The reason for this observation is an interesting question for future investigation. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present the results of an experiment on risk attitudes conducted at 
Fudan University in Shanghai. First we investigated how risk attitude depends on win 
probabilities of lotteries. The results of the selling experiment were similar to those of 
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) in that risk-loving attitudes with a win probability of 
less than 20% were confirmed. However, subjects held risk-averse attitudes when win 
probability exceeded 30%. Thus, Kachelmeier and Shehata’s results need to be 
reconsidered.  
In buying experiments, subjects showed risk-averse attitudes for all win 
probabilities. We found that subjects were more risk averse in buying experiments than 
                                                 
21 12 pairs of (u, x, y) are shown in Appendix B. 
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in selling experiments, which is generally consistent with previous literature. Our 
results are unique in that this tendency is confirmed even when the same subjects 
participated in both the selling and the buying experiments. The higher risk aversion in 
buying experiments can be interpreted as an endowment effect, as proposed in Knetsch 
and Sinden (1984) and Kahneman et al. (1990). 
Using the data from the questionnaire completed after the experiment, we observed 
that (1) males may be more risk loving than females, (2) those who have more 
knowledge of financial economics are more risk averse, and (3) absolute risk aversion is 
decreasing and relative risk aversion is constant with respect to change in wealth.  
Subjects’ risk attitudes revealed in the experiments can account for their risky asset 
holding. The risk attitudes revealed in the experiment are generally consistent with 
those revealed in the questionnaire, but risk attitudes are different depending on various 
types of risks. Finally, we find a negative correlation between risk aversion and time 
discount rate. 
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Table 1. Attributes of the subjects 
  Frequency Ratio   Frequency Ratio
Male 4 0.13 20 14 0.47
Female 26 0.86 21 13 0.43Gender 
   
Age 
NA 3 0.1 
None 2 0.07 <100,000 3 0.1 
< 1,000 1 0.03 100,000–200,000 4 0.13
1,000–
2,000 3 0.1 
200,000–
400,000 3 0.1 
2,000–
4,000 1 0.03
400,000–
600,000 5 0.17
4,000–
6,000 3 0.1 
600,000–
800,000 2 0.07
6,000–
8,000 3 0.1 
800,000–
1,000,000 2 0.07
8,000–
10,000 2 0.07
1,000,000–
1,200,000 3 0.1 
10,000–
12,000 2 0.07
1,200,000–
1,400,000 1 0.03
12,000–
14,000 3 0.1 
1,400,000–
1,600,000 0 0 
14,000–
16,000 3 0.1 > 1,600,000 1 0.03
> 16,000 1 0.03 NA 6 0.2 
Own annual 
income  
NA 6 0.2 
Household’s 
real estate  
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< 20,000 2 0.07 < 20,000 4 0.13
20,000–
40,000 8 0.27
20,000–
40,000 2 0.07
40,000–
60,000 3 0.1 
40,000–
60,000 2 0.07
60,000–
80,000 3 0.1 
60,000–
80,000 0 0 
80,000–
100,000 2 0.07
80,000–
100,000 0 0 
100,000–
120,000 0 0 
100,000–
120,000 8 0.27
120,000–
140,000 0 0 
120,000–
140,000 0 0 
140,000–
160,000 1 0.03
140,000–
160,000 1 0.03
160,000–
180,000 0 0 
160,000–
180,000 0 0 
180,000–
200,000 0 0 
180,000–
200,000 0 0 
200,000–
220,000 1 0.03
200,000–
220,000 2 0.07
> 220,000 3 0.1 > 220,000 0 0 
Household’s 
annual income 
NA 7 0.23
Household’s 
financial assets 
NA 11 0.37
Note: Income and assets are in yuan. Own annual income includes spouse’s income and support by 
parents. Household income/assets include own income/assets and those of parents. 
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Table 2. Points and payoffs won by the subjects 
  
Number of 
subjects 
Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Points  30 13033 1564 10183 16699 
Selling 
experiment Payoffs 
in yuan 
30 261 31 204 334 
Points 29 12997 1148 10804 15786 
Buying 
experiment Payoffs 
in yuan 
29 260 23 217 316 
Points 30 25597 2983 12812 29282 
Total 
Payoffs 
in yuan 
30 512 60 257 586 
Note: Points won in the buying experiment include 10,000 points given to the subjects at the outset of 
the buying experiment. In addition to payoffs above each subject is given 120 yuan as the participation 
fee. 
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Table 3. Risk attitude, win probability, and endowment effect 
Experiment Sell and buy Sell and buy Sell Buy 
Dependent 
variable 
ARA 
*1000  
TP 
ARA 
*1000 
TP  
ARA 
*1000 
TP 
ARA 
 *1000 
TP 
Model of 
estimation 
RE FE RE RE FE FE RE FE 
BUY 
0.292 
(0.000) 
0.295 
(0.002) 
1.4352
(0.000)
1.7671
(0.000)
    
PROB 
0.845 
(0.000) 
0.416 
(0.009) 
2.8677
(0.000)
6.2530
(0.000)
1.7953 
(0.010)
5.4547
(0.000)
–1.3995 
(0.094) 
0.0945 
(0.705) 
BUY*PROB   
–4.3646
(0.000)
–6.1079
(0.000)
    
PROB2   
–1.4341
(0.068)
–5.0875
(0.000)
–0.5133
(0.440)
–4.5084
(0.000)
1.5289 
(0.054) 
–0.3976 
(0.094) 
BUY*PROB2   
3.1312
(0.005)
4.6847
(0.000)
    
Constant 
–0.051 
(0.729) 
–0.305 
(0.003) 
–0.5795
(0.006)
–1.4981
(0.000)
–0.3538
(0.018)
–1.2940
(0.000)
0.8513 
(0.000) 
0.2807 
(0.000) 
Number of 
observations 
1179 1179 600 579 
Number of 
subjects 
30 30 30 29 
R2 0.0356 0.0143 0.0544 0.0601 0.0854 0.0536 0.0060 0.0393 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. RE represents random effects model; FE represents fixed effects 
model. 
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Table 4. Risk attitude and subjects’ attributes 
Dependent 
variable 
ARA 
*1000  
TP 
ARA 
*1000
TP 
ARA 
*1000
TP 
ARA 
*1000 
TP 
RRA  
(ARA*POINTS*1000)
Model of the 
estimation 
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE FE 
PROB 
0.747 
(0.000) 
0.592 
(0.002) 
1.015
(0.000)
0.687
(0.001)
0.910
(0.000)
0.458
(0.004)
0.982
(0.000)
0.854 
(0.000) 
0.5432 
(0.000) 
BUY 
0.397 
(0.000) 
0.377 
(0.001) 
0.380
(0.000)
0.357
(0.004)
0.543
(0.000)
0.511
(0.000)
0.632
(0.000)
0.677 
(0.000) 
0.5469 
(0.000) 
MALE 
–0.388 
(0.329) 
–0.681 
(0.014) 
–0.412
(0.298)
–0.629
(0.016)
–0.545
(0.116)
–0.704
(0.003)
–0.114
(0.776)
–0.504 
(0.115) 
Dropped 
ASSETS 
0.102 
(0.458) 
0.046 
(0.633) 
    
–0.276
(0.150)
–0.153 
(0.316) 
 
INCOME   
–0.158
(0.405)
–0.114
(0.363)
 
 
 
 
0.070
(0.675)
0.072 
(0.550) 
 
 
POINTS/10000 
 
 
 
 
  
–0.481
(0.001)
–0.419
(0.010)
–0.318
(0.075)
–0.460 
(0.054) 
0.0053 
(0.970) 
TEST 
0.085 
(0.532) 
0.050 
(0.600) 
0.289
(0.077)
0.168
(0.118)
0.148
(0.207)
0.073
(0.356)
0.293
(0.060)
0.176 
(0.156) 
Dropped 
Constant 
–1.730 
(0.337) 
–1.134 
(0.368) 
0.066
(0.964)
–0.084
(0.930)
–0.268
(0.556)
–0.245
(0.448)
0.162
(0.937)
–0.596 
(0.717) 
–0.1149 
(0.367) 
Number of 
observations 
959 879 1159 759 1159 
Number of 
subjects 
24 22 29 19 29 
R2  0.0537 0.0424 0.0876 0.0472 0.0710 0.0440 0.0988 0.0580 0.0460 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. RE represents random effects model; FE represents fixed effects 
model. Number of observations varies due to the lack of data for RISK and/or ASSETS. 
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Table 5. Risky asset holdings and risk attitudes 
Dependent variable RISK RISK RISK RISK RISK RISK 
AVARA*1000 
–11.8035
(0.061) 
–22.0727
(0.004) 
  
-10.9523 
(0.088) 
 
AVTP   
–5.3120 
(0.519) 
–8.5712 
(0.349) 
 
-8.4272 
(0.221) 
ASSETS 
8.1034 
(0.030) 
 
7.2039 
(0.066) 
   
FINASSETS     
5.7523 
(0.151) 
3.4924 
(0.359) 
INCOME  
1.4512 
(0.718) 
 
3.3515 
(0.508) 
  
MALE 
13.4902 
(0.164) 
8.6895 
(0.346) 
14.2525 
(0.216) 
8.5020 
(0.501) 
  
Constant 
–81.2837
(0.081) 
12.2248 
(0.727) 
–74.7764
(0.133) 
–12.1098
(0.780) 
-39.7429 
(0.348) 
-19.9415
(0.631) 
Number of observations 21 17 21 17 18 18 
Pseudo R2 0.0518 0.0815 0.0329 0.0247 0.0267 0.0159 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Estimation method is Tobit. 
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Table 6. Correlation coefficient between risk attitude in the experiment and risk 
attitude in the questionnaire 
ARA 
 AVARA RAIN VENTURE FIRE Q13ARA Q14ARA Q15ARA Q16ARA
AVARA 1.0000        
RAIN 0.3880** 1.0000       
VENTURE 0.5469*** 0.2389 1.0000      
FIRE –0.0563 0.0643 –0.0024 1.0000     
Q13ARA 0.1899 –0.2246 0.2424 0.1007 1.0000    
Q14ARA –0.0171 0.1437 0.1058 0.3080 0.0982 1.0000   
Q15ARA 0.1660 0.0197 0.1323 0.1054 0.5387*** 0.0114 1.0000  
Q16ARA 0.0409 0.0797 –0.1360 0.1073 –0.2953 –0.4129** 0.1680 1.0000 
Note: Q13ARA–Q16ARA are ARA of each subject derived from Q13–Q16 in the questionnaire. *** 
stands for significance at 1%, ** stands for significance at 5%, and * stands for significance at 10%. 
 
TP 
 AVTP RAIN VENTURE FIRE Q13TP Q14TP Q15TP Q16TP
AVTP 1.0000        
RAIN 0.1882 1.0000       
VENTURE 0.1324 0.2389 1.0000      
FIRE 0.2077 0.0643 –0.0024 1.0000     
Q13TP 0.1948 –0.3590* 0.2117 0.1085 1.0000    
Q14TP 0.1905 0.1427 0.1056 0.3076 0.1949 1.0000   
Q15TP 0.2374 –0.0293 0.1925 0.0746 0.4586** –0.0433 1.0000  
Q16TP 0.2247 0.0861 –0.0285 0.0697 –0.2809 –0.4087** 0.2531 1.0000
Note: Q13ARA–Q16TP are TP of each subject derived from Q13–Q16 in the questionnaire. *** stands 
for significance at 1%, ** stands for significance at 5% level, and * stands for significance at 10% level. 
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Appendix A 
Questions in the Test 
 
Instruction 
To examine whether your knowledge about economics is related to the results in 
experiments, we ask you to answer the following questions. Your answers to the test 
DO NOT affect the reward you earned in the experiment. That is, your reward is not 
reduced if you submit incorrect answers. 
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Question 1 
(Quoted from Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1982. Judgment of and by 
representativeness. in Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, Tversky, A., (eds). Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.) 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear 
demonstrations. 
Please rank the following statements by their probability, using 1 for most probable 
and 8 for least probable. 
(a) Linda is a teacher in elementary school. _____ 
(b) Linda works in a bookstore and takes yoga classes. _____ 
(c) Linda is active in the feminist movement. _____ 
(d) Linda is a psychiatric social worker. _____ 
(e) Linda is a member of the League of Woman Voters. _____ 
(f) Linda is a bank teller. _____ 
(g) Linda is an insurance salesperson. _____ 
(h) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. _____ 
 
Question 2 
Figure 1 depicts indifference curves for Good 1 and Good 2. Budget constraint is 
represented as the line AE. Under this budget constraint, at which point A, B, C, D, or 
E is utility maximized? Circle the correct number from the following choices. If you 
do not understand, circle “(1) I don’t know”. Do not guess. 
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(1) I don’t know. 
(2) A 
(3) B 
(4) C 
(5) D 
(6) E 
 
Question 3 
Why do people purchase insurance? Circle the correct number from the following 
choices. If you do not understand, circle “(1) I don’t know”. Do not guess. 
(1) I don’t know. 
(2) Because they are risk averse. 
(3) Because they are risk neutral. 
(4) Because they are risk loving. 
 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E Good 1 
Good 2 
Figure 1 
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Question 4 
Suppose a lottery offering 80 yuan with a 50% probability of winning and a 50% 
probability of losing. What is the expected payoff and variance of this lottery? 
Calculate the answers and fill them in the following blanks. If you do not understand, 
leave them in blank. Do not guess. 
Expected payoff ________ 
Variance ________ 
 
Question 5 
If a person purchases a ticket in the lottery in Question 4 at a price above the expected 
payoff, is this person risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving? Circle the correct 
number from the following choices. If you do not understand, circle “(1) I don’t 
know”. Do not guess. 
(1) I don’t know. 
(2) Risk averse. 
(3) Risk neutral. 
(4) Risk loving. 
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Utility 
Question 6 
Figures 2 and 3 depict the utility function for two different types. Circle the number of 
correct combinations from the following choices. If you do not understand, circle “(1) 
I don’t know”. Do not guess. 
 
 
(1) I don’t know. 
(2) A person who has the utility function in Figure 2 is risk averse; and 
A person who has the utility function in Figure 3 is risk neutral. 
(3) A person who has the utility function in Figure 2 is risk averse; and 
A person who has the utility function in Figure 3 is risk loving. 
(4) A person who has the utility function in Figure 2 is risk loving; and 
A person who has the utility function in Figure 3 is risk averse. 
(5) A person who has the utility function in Figure 2 is risk loving; and 
A person who has the utility function in Figure 3 is risk neutral. 
 
 
Wealth 
(1000 yuan) 
80 160 320 240 400 
Figure 2 
Wealth 
(1000 yuan) 
Utility 
80 160 320 240 400 
Figure 3 
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Results of Test 
Summary statistics of score 
Observation Mean Score Std Dev.  Min Max 
29 3.690 1.039 2 6 
Full score is 7. 
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Appendix B 
12 pairs of (u, x, y) 
 u (yuan) x y prize 
1 2800 one month four months no pay 
2 240 one month four months pay 
3 240 one month 13 months pay 
4 240 ten months 13 months pay 
5 2800 two days nine days pay 
6 2800 90 days 97 days pay 
7 2800 one month four months pay 
8 2800 one month 13 months pay 
9 2800 ten months four months pay 
10 800000 one month four months no pay 
11 800000 one month 13 months no pay 
12 800000 ten months 13 months no pay 
 
